Weclome to our class blog. Not only is this a good place to share new perspectives, information, cases or links, but there will be times assignments appear here, and assignments are due here. Please feel free to email me at steve@stevebdavis.com, for questions.
CREATIVITY 3.0
Monday, May 2, 2011
An Analogy between Website Search Engine and Book Search Engine
As is known to us, Google divided the all the books in the project into several groups: the ones already in public domain could be fully viewed online or downloaded; as to the ones still under copyright but the author opts in as a partner with Google, the viewable pages is decided according to the contracts; for books that may be covered by copyright and where the owner has not been identified, the full text is searchable but only "snippets" (two to three lines of text) are shown in response to customer’s search requests.
There is no problem with the first two groups. It is the third group that brings some trouble. The authors (or the Guild) allege it is copyright infringement because Google makes copies of copyrighted works by scanning them and store the digitalized copy in its database.
This made me think of the regular search engine, which is conducting almost the same copying behavior as Google book. It seems difficult to find a sound legal basis to argue industrial practice in the dispute, but it confused me that same behavior leads to two results.
According to my knowledge, the way most search engines work is that a robot keeps crawling through thousands of hundreds websites every minutes and coping the web pages into a big database. When a customer submits a search request to the search engine, the engine would search for the terms in its own database and respond with the results.
Many of the web pages are actually carrying copyrighted works, but nobody objects to be crawled and copied by the search engine. The reason is that it is a default that all the web pages want to be searched and viewed by the customers. Being crawled and searched by search engines greatly increases a webpage’s chance to be found and viewed by a customer. If a page doesn’t want to be searched by the search engine, it could easily adjust its metatags or other technical feathers to “opt-out”.
So it seems to be a wide accepted custom or rule in the search engine industry that copying copyrighted works for the sole purpose of building a database to be searched instead of displaying the contents is allowed.
The Google Books Project is in a similar situation. Digitalizing the books is just a process of building a search engine database, like the robot crawling through the websites. Google doesn’t substantially display the contents to the public. On the contrary, people are able to know certain books contain the information they need by searching the full context and could be directed to buy the hard or digital copies. So Google Book is actually increasing the sale of books.
Intuitively, mass scanning books is more acceptable and easier to be regarded as an infringement. However, when we think it over, we can see there is no essential difference between the website search engine and book search engine. If Google Books is copyright infringement, most of the regular search engines should also be.
Could anybody explain why the same behavior leads to two totally different results? One is OK while the other is copyright infringement? The only reasonable answer I could think of, though I still doubt it, is regular search engines are actually infringing. People can sue the regular search engines if they want, though nobody actually sues them because it is an industrial practice which has peacefully existed for more than ten years and the copying process is not as visible as scanning so that it is not as acceptable by ordinary people.
Both legal and technical comments are welcome!
Cheers,
Lawrence
GROUP 3-BIG BUSINESS-May 2 in class discussion
Roles:
Viacom-Two Representatives
YouTube (Google)
Apple
Sony
Cable
Bing (search engine)
What would a fair balance look like?
In my opinion, the You Tube case hinges on whether general knowledge is sufficient to trigger an obligation to act under the DCMA. Because the legislative history is not clear on whether general knowledge or specific knowledge constitutes “actual knowledge” of infringement, there is a need to clarify this point so that emerging technology business models will understand the risk they are undertaking in making user generated content available to the public. Given the wide-spread use and acceptance of websites such as You Tube, there is strong motivation to continue to enable these sites to perform their services without incurring liability. On the other hand, there is an equally strong policy for ensuring that content holders can effectively protect their intellectual property against the wide-spread unauthorized dissemination of the content. While requiring specific knowledge of an infringing video (or any protected content for that matter) appears to strike a balance at first blush, a closer look reveals that the balance falls heavily on the side of the consuming public and the technology providers (and not for content providers). The You Tube opinion seems to suggest that turning a blind eye (i.e. willful blindness) to the actual use of a website is sufficient to maintain DCMA safe harbor protection, even though there is testimonial evidence that You Tube knew and in part wished to capitalize on the general infringing uses on the website. To me, I think a better balance would be to impose some burden on the internet provider (read here to mean a provider that does something more than merely providing a channel; for example, providing a viewing platform or searchable database would be sufficient to trigger the additional step for obtaining safe harbor protection) to implement some type of filtering technology on the website. Perhaps an even more equitable balance between the competing interests of ISPs and content holders would be to split the cost of developing and applying the filter? Either way, the current distinction between general and specific knowledge seems insufficient to adequately protect content holders' rights in their work.
Sunday, May 1, 2011
Anna's opinion re: Viacom v. Youtube
New business models, technologies, and social media create mass copyright infringement. Therefore, there is a need to either reduce the level of copyright protection, or increase the control on media, or both of them. We cannot diminish interests of neither copyright holders nor technologies. We need to find the right balance between them.
These are my proposals:
1. A patent owner should police its patent rights (Wanlass v. General Elec. Co. 148 F. 3d. 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Similarly, a copyright owner, who wants to enjoy its monopoly and revenue, should police its copyright too. Based on this principle, the owner must review its copyrights and realize a notice of infringement.
2. A copyright organization or society will collect these notices, provide legal services, negotiate with infringers, and litigate.
3. A special copyright court, such as the Federal Circuit, will handle the copyright infringement cases only. It could relieve the district courts and be more specialized.
4. Establish mandatory copyright registration in the U.S. Copyright office.
5. Create a consolidate database of all copyrighted works accessible to the public, including ISPs.
6. ISPs will develop new control and filtering software for avoiding infringement as much as possible.
7. Extend boundaries of the Fair Use doctrine.
8. Licensed music, video, and digital services should be cheaper.
9. Promote legal education of society about copyright law.
Thursday, April 28, 2011
YouTube Litigation in Italy - The RTI v. YouTube case before the Rome Tribunal
Italy has had its Viacom too. And even though, unlike in Germany, a decision has not yet been issued on the merits, a summary judgment and an injunctive order have been granted to the plaintiff against YouTube, anticipating a likely different outcome from the one endorsed by the S.D.N.Y. in the U.S..
The Court found for the plaintiff and issued an injunctive order requiring YouTube to take-down the videos.
Here's the Tribunal’s legal analysis on the question of the applicability of the safe-harbors.
First of all, the Court endorsed the plaintiff’s view according to which YouTube acts over the internet as a “sui generis” ISP whose activity does not fit with the statutory definition of the “hosting providers” as identified by the Directive and the Italian e-Commerce Act.
The Court specifically held that YouTube “didn’t limit its activities to providing the users the mere availability of server space where they could independently upload and organize content onto” . Rather, the Court found “undeniable” that the ISP acted as a “digital broadcaster” operating in direct competition with the RTI tv channels and with RTI proprietary website, given the provider’s evident efforts devoted to the indexing, the aggregation and the organization of the uploaded material which granted the users the possibility to access to the content through a quick search of the title of the work, of the specific episode and the original “on air” date .
The Court indeed noted that YouTube business model was based on the very “programming of the content for the fruition of the users”, activity which was undertaken for patent commercial purposes, being the indexing, aggregation and organization of the content strictly functional to the triggering of key-word-based advertisement revenues.
In fact, in the Court’s interpretation, the knowledge standard required by Article 16 is met when an ISP receives any kind notification from the content owner which is sufficient to reasonably establish the ownership of the content and reasonably identify the allegedly infringing material, the law certainly not requiring an URL-specific notification.
Under the facts of the case, RTI had sent YouTube a massive number of cease-and-desist letters properly identifying the material with the title of the works - which was embedded in almost all the titles and the search tags connected to the uploaded videos – and yet the ISP did not activate in any way to verify the “suspect content” or even to cooperate with the owner to verify the alleged infringement, a situation that persisted also after the filing the lawsuit. According to the Tribunal, based on these facts YouTube had at least reason to suspect that an infringing activity was going on and that apparently illegal content was present on its servers and its website.
It seems that the very business model carried on by YouTube is being delegitimated.
But who has the solution? And is it really the cure better than the disease?
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Law suit versus YouTube in Germany - LG Hamburg 308 O 27/09
(At the end the posting is a little bit longer than 200 words...). In a recent ruling by the District Court (“Landgericht”) Hamburg (Decision of September 3rd 2010, 308 O 27/09) the court assumed a direct responsibility of the video platform YouTube for publication of copyrighted content. This content had been uploaded by users of the platform on www.youtube.de (the German YouTube platform).
The judges dissent from former decisions of the same court (for example LG Hamburg 324 O 197/08, 324 O 565/08). In these decisions the court adopted liability of platform providers only if they had actual knowledge of the infringing action and failed to remove the infringing content in time. The latest dissenting decision would significant raise the risk for platform provider.
In this case, plaintiff is owner of various copyright protected materials. Users of the YouTube platform uploaded copies of the protected materials to the platform, for example video clips, pieces of music and artwork, and live recordings.
The court held that YouTube has adopted the user generated infringing content as its own. Thus, any privilege for ISPs is waived and YouTube is not only liable for omission but also for damages. At the end a non-exclusive license was YouTube’s undoing. YouTube’s users have to agree to a license allowing YouTube to use the uploaded content, this provision is necessary to run the service properly. But the Hamburg court assumed that this license grant causes YouTube to adopt the licensed content – even beside any promise of the users that the uploaded and licensed content would not infringe any copyright. On appeal of the Viacom law suit in the U.S., Viacom seems to argue on a similar base as the court in Hamburg (Appeal Brief page 52).
At least, the decision in Hamburg was made by a lower court and should now be on appeal (actually, there is no file number known at the moment). The District Court of Hamburg is known for its (sometimes) strange outcomes in lawsuits dealing with new technologies. But in another case the German Supreme Court (“Bundesgerichtshof”) affirmed a decision of the Hamburg Court of Appeal (“Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht”) regarding another case related to user generated content (“Marions Kochbuch”, BGH I ZR 166/07, provider is liable for user generated content under certain circumstances).
At least, YouTube could maybe change its business model in a way that its users broadcast their own content using the technical platform/services of YouTube. That would prevent the necessity of a license and also reduce the contribution of YouTube to a true Hosting and Access Provider.
Monday, April 25, 2011
Studios partnering with Youtube to rent movies?
Click here for the story.
I saw it through my twitter feed of @techcrunch. For the twitter minded, it's a pretty good source of information.
Cheers!
Jomo